Grade Qwen 6-bit on webhook prompt: 75/100 Minor Flaws (runs, all 4 tests pass)

Fourth data point on Qwen 3.6 35B-A3B 6-bit MLX:
  LFU cache    82  (runs)
  Webhook     75  (runs, all tests pass) <- best non-LFU result
  TTS pipeline 49  (doesn't parse)
  Rust service 50  (7 compile errors)

Profile sharpens: Qwen 6-bit handles SINGLE-HANDLER logic well
(webhook HMAC/idempotency/rate-limit/429-backoff all correct) but fails
on multi-task orchestration (TTS) and typed/compiled langs (Rust).
Safe offload for HTTP/bridge/verification work; not for pipelines or Rust.

Added webhook prompt_id + pillar set. (Initial paste was mangled -
stripped '=' signs - re-pasted clean.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

data/benchmark_history.json

@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@
       "automation": {
         "label": "Automation Glue (idempotent batch)",
         "file": "prompts/automation_glue.txt"
+      },
+      "webhook": {
+        "label": "Webhook Bridge (HMAC/idempotency/rate-limit)",
+        "file": "prompts/webhook_bridge.txt"
       }
     }
   },
@@ -470,6 +474,41 @@
         "Several `let _ = tx.send(...)` silently swallow channel-closed errors."
       ],
       "patch_code": "// FIX 1 (the API hallucination): tokio mpsc has no bounded().\n//   let (item_tx, item_rx) = mpsc::bounded(32);\nlet (item_tx, item_rx) = mpsc::channel(32);\n\n// FIX 2 (type mismatch):\ntokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20 + (id as u64 % 30))).await;\n\n// FIX 3 (ownership in shutdown): store JoinHandles in Option + take them,\n// and make shutdown take &mut self (or hold senders in Option):\nstruct WatcherEntry { status: WatcherStatus, consecutive_failures: u32, join_handle: Option<JoinHandle<()>> }\n// in shutdown: let handles: Vec<_> = inner.watchers.values_mut().map(|e| e.join_handle.take()).flatten().collect();\n//   drop(self.item_tx.take()) etc. with Option<Sender> fields.\n\n// FIX 4 (remove_watcher must actually stop the task): either send on a per-watcher\n// oneshot/CancellationToken, or broadcast shutdown to that watcher's sub-channel.\n// Simplest: give each watcher a CancellationToken; remove_watcher cancels it, then awaits the handle.\n\n// FIX 5 (test isolation): inject the fetch fn into watcher_loop as a parameter so tests\n// can pass a failing mock; drop the dead global flag.\n// FIX 6: add `fn main() { ... }` or make it `cargo test`-only and document that."
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "qwen3.6-35b-a3b-6bit-mlx-webhook",
+      "prompt_id": "webhook",
+      "timestamp": "2026-07-29T01:05:00Z",
+      "model_name": "Qwen 3.6 35B-A3B",
+      "quant": "6-bit MLX",
+      "param_size": "35B-A3B (MoE)",
+      "format": "mlx",
+      "lang": "python",
+      "tok_sec": 69.24,
+      "total_tokens": 12595,
+      "ttft_sec": 0.95,
+      "filename": "outputs/qwen3.6-35b-a3b-6bit-mlx-webhook.py",
+      "tests_pass": true,
+      "total_score": 75,
+      "breakdown": {
+        "schema_io": 16,
+        "transport": 14,
+        "error_handling": 16,
+        "state_safety": 14,
+        "test_integrity": 15
+      },
+      "verdict": "Minor Logic Flaws",
+      "best_for": "Best non-LFU result for this model (75 vs TTS 49, Rust 50). Runs clean, passes all 4 tests, implements HMAC + idempotency + token-bucket rate-limit + 429 backoff correctly. Safe to offload single-handler HTTP/bridge logic (webhooks, signature verification, rate-limited forwarding). AVOID for multi-task orchestration (TTS) and typed/compiled languages (Rust).",
+      "critical_bugs": [
+        "Clock inconsistency: IdempotencyStore uses time.time() (system clock) while TokenBucketLimiter uses time.monotonic() \u2014 an NTP jump could wrongly expire/replay events. Should be monotonic everywhere.",
+        "No max-body cap: handle_client does reader.readexactly(content_length) with no limit \u2014 a hostile Content-Length could force a huge allocation (DoS). The rate limiter doesn't protect pre-parse.",
+        "forward_timestamps list grows unbounded (append-only, only cleared in tests) \u2014 memory leak for a long-running service.",
+        "HTTP reason phrase is the raw message string (HTTP/1.1 200 Forwarded) \u2014 works for the bundled test client but is not valid HTTP for real clients/proxies.",
+        "No Content-Type validation on incoming requests (accepts any).",
+        "Idempotency eviction is lazy (only on is_seen) \u2014 a quiet store retains stale entries until next access; not a leak in steady state but imperfect.",
+        "Tests are mildly timing-flaky: 5% random 429 in discord_send + a tight '>1.0s' threshold; no tests for the 400 (bad JSON) or missing-signature 401 paths even though the code handles them."
+      ],
+      "patch_code": "# FIX 1 (clock): use monotonic for TTL too.\nclass IdempotencyStore:\n    def is_seen(self, event_id):\n        now = time.monotonic()\n        ...\n    def mark(self, event_id):\n        self.store[event_id] = time.monotonic()\n\n# FIX 2 (body cap): reject oversized bodies before reading.\nMAX_BODY = 64 * 1024\ncontent_length = int(headers.get('content-length', 0))\nif content_length > MAX_BODY:\n    writer.write(b'HTTP/1.1 413 Payload Too Large\\r\\nContent-Length: 0\\r\\n\\r\\n'); await writer.drain(); return\nbody = await reader.readexactly(content_length) if 0 < content_length <= MAX_BODY else b''\n\n# FIX 3 (leak): bound forward_timestamps (deque maxlen=N) or drop it if unused.\nfrom collections import deque\nself.forward_timestamps: deque = deque(maxlen=1000)\n\n# FIX 4 (reason phrase): use a fixed map.\nREASON = {200:'OK',400:'Bad Request',401:'Unauthorized',404:'Not Found',502:'Bad Gateway',500:'Internal Server Error'}\nresponse = f'HTTP/1.1 {status} {REASON.get(status,\"OK\")}\\r\\n...'\n\n# FIX 5: add tests for the 400 (malformed JSON) and missing-signature 401 paths."
     }
   ]
 }